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rior to adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 
creditors that repossessed collateral had inherent duties of 
preservation, good faith, and reasonableness in disposal and sale.1  
Repossession arises frequently in the bankruptcy context where the 
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1 See Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction 
and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 190–91 (2000) (examining the duties of 
repayment under common law principles in a personal property context); FDIC Can Be 
P
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debtor has defaulted on a security agreement obligation and the 
creditor exercises his right to take the collateral back for his own use 
or for sale.2  Sections 9-207(a) and 9-610(a)–(b), which have now 
been adopted in all fifty states,3 prescribe the creditor’s duties in 
dealing with collateral in his possession for preservation and 
reasonable disposal.4  Though both UCC provisions seem relatively 
straightforward, the reasonableness standard implicit to each creates 
inconsistencies in federal and state case law.5  Moreover, the relative 
 
Sued on a Contract Claim; Did Not Breach Duties in Disposing of Stock, BANK BAILOUT 
LITIG. NEWS, Oct. 11, 1999 (“The UCC codified the common law that indicated duties and 
relations, such as the duty of commercial reasonableness, are created between parties when 
personal property is pledged as collateral on a loan, thereby becoming part of the contract.  
Any remedy sought by a party would be a contract claim.”). 
2 See Barkley Clark, Revised Article 9 of the UCC: Scope, Perfection, Priorities, and 
Default, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 129, 136–39 (2000) (outlining the process through which 
creditors can achieve perfection and properly repossess collateral upon default); see also 
Lawrence R. Ahern, III, “Workouts” Under Revised Article 9: A Review of Changes and 
Proposal for Study, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 115, 116–18 (2001) (stressing the impact 
of Article 9 revisions on bankruptcy proceedings). 
3 John Lucas, Comment, The Article 9 Buyer’s Seller Rule & the Justification for Its 
Harsh Effects, 83 OR. L. REV. 289, 289 (2004) (asserting that all fifty states adopted the 
Article 9 revisions in July 2001). 
4 Section 9-207, “Rights and Duties of Secured Party Having Possession or Control of 
Collateral,” states that: 
 (a) [Duty of care when secured party in possession.] Except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (d), a secured party shall use reasonable care in the 
custody and preservation of collateral in the secured party’s possession.  In the 
case of chattel paper or an instrument, reasonable care includes taking necessary 
steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise agreed. 
U.C.C. § 9-207(a) (2005).  Section 9-610, “Disposition of Collateral after Default,” states 
that: 
 (a) [Disposition after default.] After default, a secured party may sell, lease, 
license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition 
or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing. 
 (b) [Commercially reasonable disposition.] Every aspect of a disposition of 
collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be 
commercially reasonable.  If commercially reasonable, a secured party may 
dispose of collateral by public or private proceedings, by one or more contracts, 
as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms. 
U.C.C. § 9-610(a)–(b) (2005). 
5 Margit Livingston, Survey of Cases Decided Under Revised Article 9: There’s Not 
Much New Under the Sun, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 47, 78–79, 92–95 (2003) 
(exploring the implications of sections 9-207 and 9-610 in case law articulating the duties 
of a creditor in possession of collateral). 
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sparseness of relevant cases further exacerbates the discrepancies 
among jurisdictions.6 
The following analysis will explore a secured party’s duties under 
sections 9-207(a) and 9-610 individually and in tandem to reveal that, 
despite the clarity of the statute on its face, variances abound.7  The 
differences in application of these provisions of the UCC create 
uncertainty in the marketplace, which is detrimental during times of 
economic decline.8  Given the higher incidences of default in times of 
economic recession, valuation becomes a key determinant of the 
outcome for the parties involved.9  Furthermore, unique collateral 
becomes increasingly difficult to value in a slow economy because of 
reduced demand.10  Accordingly, collateral with an established 
market is easier to value. 11  This facilitation in collateral valuation 
 
6 See infra Part II (analyzing jurisdictional inconsistencies); see also Livingston, supra 
note 5, at 48-49 (chronicling the absence of an impact of leading Article 9 cases decided 
after the 2001 revisions). 
7 See infra Part II (identifying the patterns and disparate applications of sections 9-207 
and 9-610 in state and federal case law). 
8 See, e.g., Hotels’ Debt-Service Coverage, Value to Decline in 2009, MORTGAGE 
BANKING, Mar. 2009, at 89, 89–90 (examining the decline in the hospitality industry 
amidst a larger economic decline); Hugh Larratt-Smith & Jim Gagan, The Bicycle Theory 
of Management: Things Sure Get Wobbly When the Bicycle Slows Down, SECURED 
LENDER, Mar. 2009, at 25, 26–27 (illustrating the impact of the economic decline through 
the record decreases in the commodities market); Leonard I. Nakamura, Lessons on 
Lending and Borrowing in Hard Times, BUS. REV., July/Aug. 1991, at 13, 16 (recounting 
the negative impact on valuation of unique collateral, such as oil rigs, during the recession 
of the late 1980s). 
9 See Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valuation 
Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357, 372–77 (2003) (explaining the intricacies of new 
valuation techniques relevant to bankruptcy proceedings); see also Marjorie Chertok & 
Warren E. Agin, Restart.com: Identifying, Securing and Maximizing the Liquidation Value 
of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 255, 263–65 
(2000) (emphasizing the importance of consistent valuation in assessing intangible assets 
such as intellectual property). 
10 See Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F.2d 173, 174–75 (1st Cir. 1989) (describing 
a security agreement in which light fixture inventory served as collateral); Ray v. City 
Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (noting the various 
descriptions of and narrow uses for hydraulic raising rams pledged as collateral); see also 
Chertok & Agin, supra note 9 (noting the difficulties in valuing intangible assets such as 
domain names and the impact of ownership status); Patrick Hosmann, Jr., Market 
Viewpoint: Patrick Hosmann, Jr., Vice President, Southern Cross Aviation, LLC, BUS. & 
COM. AVIATION, Mar. 2009, at 88 (explaining the plight of small business owners using 
planes as collateral in a deep recession); Nakamura, supra note 8 (observing the difficulty 
in valuing unique assets tied to a volatile sector, such as oil drilling equipment). 
11 See First State Bank v. Hallett, 722 S.W.2d 555, 555–56 (Ark. 1987) (outlining a 
default leading to the repossession of a debtor’s truck as collateral to secure a loan); 
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leads to a more straightforward assessment of the adequacy of the 
secured party’s preservation and disposal of collateral.12  
Additionally, this Article will investigate the effect of turbulence in 
the domestic and global markets on creditors’ duties of preservation 
and reasonable sale or disposal under sections 9-207(a) and 9-610.13 
Reduced expectations as to valuation of an asset as a result of a 
decline in the larger economic climate are prevalent during a deep 
recession, such as the current global recession.14  This analysis takes a 
holistic approach to evaluating relevant federal and state case law 
involving disputes as to a potential breach of a secured party’s duty 
under section 9-207(a), section 9-610, or both.15  Few significant 
differences exist between state and federal treatment of these issues 
because of the uniform nature of commercial law and exclusive 
federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases.16  Thus, comparison and 
discussion of both lines of case law are appropriate.  Patterns in the 
case law demonstrate that the outcomes of creditor-repossession duty 
cases are driven both by the parties’ past dealings and by the 
underlying economic environment.17 
 
Herman Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 494–95 (Iowa 1977) (discussing 
the valuation of automobiles pledged as collateral and subsequently repossessed as part of 
a security agreement); Camden Nat’l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 330–31 (Me. 1973) 
(describing the private sale of automobile collateral and the remaining deficiency on a 
promissory note); Barkley Clark, Secured Transactions, 42 BUS. LAW. 1333, 1393–94 
(1987) (noting that collateral sold on “more routinized” secondary markets has a more 
readily ascertainable value). 
12 See Clark, supra note 11 (noting the relationship between higher collateral sales 
volume and ease of valuation). 
13 See infra Part II.A–B (asserting that the cyclical nature of a macroeconomy creates a 
ripple effect in applying Article 9). 
14 See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 
83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663, 734 (2009) (arguing that bankruptcy law must become 
“transformative” amidst “The Great Recession of 2008–2009”); Anna Gelpern, Financial 
Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2009) (asserting that traditional 
valuation tools become “inadequate” during times of deep economic decline); Larratt-
Smith & Gagan, supra note 8, at 26–27 (illustrating the weakness of the global economy 
based on commodities futures and the availability of capital). 
15 See infra Part II (surveying the current case law and explaining the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on collateral valuation). 
16 See infra Part II (comparing state and federal treatment of section 9-610 and section 
9-207 issues and finding few substantive differences); see also Lucas, supra note 3 (stating 
that the UCC’s impetus was “simplifying, clarifying, and modernizing the law in order to 
facilitate commercial transactions”). 
17 See infra Part II (linking economic conditions to courts’ application of sections 9-610 
and 9-207). 
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As in many aspects of the commercial marketplace, economic 
turbulence fundamentally shapes legal outcomes even when applying 
a transactional statute such as the UCC, which was designed to 
increase predictability and uniformity to reduce unnecessary business 
risk.18  These economic cycles, though predictable in hindsight, do 
little to ameliorate the valuation ambiguities that plague cases 
involving the sale or preservation of unique collateral.19  This Article 
concludes with recommendations for practitioners in this area based 
on case law trends and the impact on the macroeconomic 
environment.20 
I 
INTERPRETING ARTICLE 9 PROVISIONS AMIDST REVISION AND 
RECESSION 
The 2001 revisions to the UCC were intended to create uniformity 
among jurisdictions and to eliminate the uncertainty around 
definitions such as “security interest,” which had plagued the UCC 
since 1972.21  The substantive effect of the 2001 Article 9 revisions 
was initially thought to be broad, yet the impact on commercial cases 
has been minimal.22  Moreover, as a result of the revisions, myriad 
sections of the UCC were renumbered, including section 9-610, 
 
18 See, e.g., Valerie Combs, The Law of Intermediated Securities: U.C.C. Versus 
UNIDROIT, 58 ALA. L. REV. 399, 403–04 (2006) (discussing the risk minimization 
impetus behind the UCC and its amendments); Christian A. Johnson, Derivatives and 
Rehypothecation Failure: It’s 3:00 P.M., Do You Know Where Your Collateral Is?, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 949, 972–74 (1997) (identifying the role of Revised Article 9 provisions, 
including section 9-207, in minimizing lender risk); Aaron J. Wright, Note, Rendered 
Impracticable: Behavioral Economics and the Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2183, 2203–04 (2005) (arguing that risk minimization persists “even in the face of 
the economy’s cyclical booms and depressions”). 
19 See generally Larratt-Smith & Gagan, supra note 8 (observing the cyclical yet 
unpredictable nature of economic recession in a global economy); Wright, supra note 18, 
at 2202–03 (discussing a heuristic economic theory). 
20 See infra Conclusion (providing guidelines for practitioners wrestling with valuation 
issues amidst turbulent economic conditions). 
21 Livingston, supra note 5, at 47–49 (stating that uniformity and predictability in 
defining and perfecting the security interest were the main impetuses behind the Article 9 
revisions). 
22 See generally Clark, supra note 2 (analyzing the impact of the Revised Article 9 on 
case law); Livingston, supra note 5 (outlining the UCC revision process and its subsequent 
effect on commercial cases). 
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which was formerly section 9-504.23  This section number change had 
little more than a facial impact on the section, as did many other 
numbering changes in 2001.24  Thus, the pre-2001 case law on section 
9-504 remains relevant to an analysis of section 9-610.25  Generally, 
the case law on sections 9-207 and 9-610 is sparse, which is a 
reflection of the mechanical, transactional nature of these 
provisions.26  This Article attempts to identify the universe of relevant 
state and federal cases on the interplay between sections 9-207 and 9-
610 to analyze the effect of economic conditions on jurisprudence in 
the area of secured party duties upon default in secured transactions.27 
A.  Secured Party Collateral Preservation Duties: Section 9-207 
Section 9-207 is a central provision of the creditor’s self-help 
remedies upon default and generally requires the post-repossession 
secured party to take “reasonable care” of the asset to preserve its 
value.28  This task becomes increasingly difficult in cases of unique 
collateral, such as large specialized machinery, or collateral that is 
difficult to store or preserve because of its physical characteristics.29  
Moreover, when financial assets are pledged as collateral and trigger 
section 9-207 as a result of repossession, the secured party’s duties 
become increasingly complex and ambiguous.30 
 
23 See Livingston, supra note 5, at 94–95 (summarizing the changes to section 9-504 in 
the Revised Article 9).  The author notes that the impact of the revisions to Article 9 were 
subtle but did not constitute a “major ‘sea of change’ in the law.”  Id. at 97. 
24 See id. at 84–85 (referring to commercial reasonableness under the former section 9-
504 interchangeably with the revised provisions). 
25 See id. at 94–95 (noting that cases decided before the 2001 revisions tended to 
employ slightly different criteria for assessing commercial reasonableness under the 
former section 9-504 (revised section 9-610)).  Despite this difference in the emphasis on 
sales price and procedure, both sets of cases applied the “commercial reasonableness” 
standard to situations involving a secured party’s allegation of improper foreclosure sales.  
Id. 
26 See Clark, supra note 2, at 130–31 (noting the “predictable framework of the UCC” 
in integrating lien statutes into the commercial securitization process). 
27 See infra Part II (connecting changes in case law to changes in the overall economic 
environment). 
28 U.C.C. § 9-207(a) (2005) (prescribing the duty of reasonable care for a creditor in 
possession of collateral upon default); see also Clark, supra note 2, at 170–71 (explaining 
repossession as a creditor self-help remedy under Article 9). 
29 See Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D. Ohio 1973) 
(identifying hydraulic oil drilling machinery as pledged collateral). 
30 See Chain Tech., Inc. v. Fleet Nat’l Bank, 293 B.R. 299, 302–04 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
2003) (explaining a complex consignment agreement between a debtor, a gold refiner, and 
creditors); In re MJK Clearing, Inc., 286 B.R. 109, 115–16 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) 
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The classic case of a creditor’s breach of section 9-207 duties 
involves physical neglect of collateral after a secured party has 
possessed it upon default.31  It is important to note, however, that the 
duty of preservation is not synonymous with any obligation on the 
part of the secured party to act in the debtor’s best interest while the 
secured party is in possession of the collateral.32  The interplay 
between a secured party’s duty to preserve financial assets in his 
possession can have a direct bearing on assessing risk in international 
business transactions, where business decisions become increasingly 
difficult to analyze when a third party assumes control of the 
collateral.33  Additionally, though a secured party’s breach of the duty 
of preservation may be apparent, the damages may become difficult 
to quantify during turbulent economic conditions.34 
Cases involving a section 9-207 dispute often arise out of sheer 
administrative error that easily could have been prevented had the 
secured party engaged in adequate oversight of the repossession 
process.35  Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co.36 provides a poignant 
 
(describing a security agreement involving loan securities and additional liquid assets that 
declined in value after the 2001 stock market decline); Segovia v. Equities First Holdings, 
LLC, No. 06C-09-149-JRS, 2008 WL 2251218, at *5–8 (Del. Super. Ct. May 30, 2008) 
(outlining a pledged stock agreement serving as collateral and the effect of a subsequent 
sale on a security agreement); Barclays Bank v. Heady Electric Co., 571 N.Y.S.2d 650, 
652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (describing the creditor liability arising out of the sale of an 
electric company’s equipment and its additional assets). 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that a 
creditor in possession of collateral failed to prevent vandalism and theft); Ray, 358 F. 
Supp. at 638 (finding “ample evidence” of a wrongful attachment and a breach of creditor 
duties with respect to repossessed machinery). 
32 Harris v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 193 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716–17 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(finding that the secured party bank was not obligated to act in the debtor’s best interest in 
preserving the value of the promissory note pledged as collateral and reasoning that the 
bank did not have a primary fiduciary relationship to the debtor because “it would be 
absurd to think that Key Bank could never take its own interests into account”). 
33 See Am. Express Int’l Banking Corp. v. Sabet, 512 F. Supp. 463, 464–65, 468 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (exploring the creditor’s defense based on expropriation after the Iranian 
government expropriated the debtor corporation’s assets as part of the 1979 revolution in 
Iran, which in part precipitated the creditor’s claims). 
34 See Stead v. United States, 419 F.3d 944, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the 
IRS payment timing rules were relevant to the lost record of a payment against a tax levy); 
Baus, 834 F.2d at 1119–20 (recounting situations where, though damage determination 
was final, claims arising out of improper foreclosure proceedings remained at issue); 
Segovia, 2008 WL 2251218, at *17–18 (analyzing the damages calculation based on the 
decreased value of the pledged stock and the timing of default). 
35 See, e.g., Stead, 419 F.3d at 946 (summarizing the bank and the debtors’ lack of 
adequate records of the transfer of funds to the IRS to satisfy a tax levy); Baus, 834 F.2d at 
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example of a lack of secured party supervision, wherein the Sheriff’s 
Office noticed and attached the wrong piece of machinery.37  This 
mistake went undiscovered for a year, during which time the 
machinery was vandalized and eventually sold for scrap at a greatly 
diminished value.38  Not surprisingly, the Ray court found that the 
secured party had utterly failed “to act in a commercially reasonable 
manner.”39 
Similarly, in United States v. Baus,40 the secured party neglected to 
take proper care of collateral under section 9-207 by leaving the 
collateral in an unsecured warehouse for nearly two years.41  In 
contrast to Ray, the scope of the repossession was proper in Baus, yet 
the Economic Development Administration, the government agency 
that guaranteed the loan, purportedly breached its obligation to 
preserve the value of the collateral in its possession.42  The collateral 
in Baus consisted of the debtor’s plant, machinery, equipment, and 
inventory located in Puerto Rico.43  The theft and vandalism to the 
collateral in the debtor’s plant that occurred during the ensuing delay 
in the sale of the remaining inventory led to an approximate eighty-
eight percent decline in the value of the debtor’s inventory.44  The 
 
1120 (asserting that an administrative delay in foreclosing on property exacerbated the 
theft and vandalism damages to collateral); Ray, 358 F. Supp. at 638 (noting that the 
sheriff’s error in improperly attaching the collateral was not pledged under the security 
agreement). 
36 Ray, 358 F. Supp. 630. 
37 Id. at 638 (asserting that the attachment order was “demonstrably overbroad” and led 
to the wrongful attachment of the plaintiff’s heavy machinery and concluding that the 
“[i]mplied malice” requirement of wrongful attachment was met as a result of the bank’s 
“willful failure” to release the improperly attached collateral). 
38 Id. at 641–42 (assessing the liability of the bank and the sheriff as a result of the 
wrongful attachment).  The court was clear in its admonition of the creditor bank’s 
conduct: “The conduct of the bank cannot be condoned.  Especially is this so with regard 
to its refusal to amend the attachment so as to exclude any reference to the Ideco rig, and 
its failure to take any action, for over a year, to sell or dispose of the property.”  Id. at 642. 
39 Id. at 642 (finding the bank liable for a breach of common law duties and obligations 
under section 9-207). 
40 Baus, 834 F.2d 1114. 
41 Id. at 1116. 
42 Id. at 1125–27 (summarizing the basis for the debtor’s allegations of breach of the 
secured party’s duties arising under sections 9-504, 9-207, 9-307, and 9-507 and stating 
that these claims arose out of the delay in foreclosing on the debtor’s right of redemption 
upon a final sale of the collateral). 
43 Id. at 1116. 
44 Id. at 1116–17 (explaining that $100,000 of the debtor’s inventory netted just $12,131 
after the expenses of the sale were taken into account following the delay). 
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First Circuit in Baus found it “likely” that the government guarantor 
had breached its duties under section 9-207 and several other 
provisions with respect to the collateral.45  However, the First Circuit 
reversed and remanded the case to the district court for a more 
complete determination of the validity of the debtor’s allegations that 
the secured party guarantor materially breached its duty of 
commercial reasonableness.46  Baus and Ray represent two common 
factual scenarios that arise when a debtor becomes insolvent upon 
default or enters bankruptcy proceedings.47  Though section 9-207 
defines creditor duties in detail, other central self-help sections such 
as section 9-610 further define the secured party’s duties with respect 
to collateral.48  Market conditions and valuation take on paramount 
importance in disposal and liquidation.49 
B.  Exploring the Commercial Reasonableness Standard Under 
Section 9-610 
Section 9-610 provides a detailed procedure for a secured party or 
creditor in possession of collateral that seeks to sell the collateral.50  
Generally, a secured party will auction or sell the collateral in an 
attempt to recoup all or a portion of his or her investment.51  During 
times of financial downturn such as the current “Great Recession,” 
such remedies become more widely employed as a result of an 
increased volume in debtor default.52  Courts have taken four 
 
45 Id. at 1127–28. 
46 Id. 
47 See infra Part II.C (discussing the close interplay between the Bankruptcy Code and 
Article 9). 
48 See supra note 4 (providing the full text of the collateral sale process under section 9-
610). 
49 See Wright, supra note 18 (observing the effects of economic conditions on Article 9 
transactions); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of 
valuation in complex transactions including bankruptcy workouts). 
50 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (quoting U.C.C. § 9-610). 
51 See Clark, supra note 2, at 165–69 (discussing remedies available to a secured party 
upon debtor default). 
52 See Bussel & Klee, supra note 14, at 734–35 (emphasizing the need for legislative 
action to stem the effects of the 2008–2009 recession); Jose Gabilondo, Leveraged 
Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit Market, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 447, 
504 (2009) (observing the increase in corporate defaults following the recession beginning 
in mid-2007 coinciding with a “general worsening of the corporate sector”); Steven L. 
Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 
59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1039-40 (2008) (summarizing global trends in default rates in 
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differing approaches to section 9-610, all of which are based upon the 
difficult-to-define notion of commercial reasonableness.53  This 
reasonableness standard is highly dependent on the facts of a given 
transaction as well as the economic climate surrounding the 
transaction.54 
The sale of unique collateral adds another level of complexity to 
assessing potential debtor damages based on a creditor’s violation of 
section 9-610.55  First, the secured party creditor often lacks the 
market expertise needed to sell unique collateral for an amount that 
the debtor would consider fair or reasonable.56  Second, inherently 
unique collateral often lacks an established market and therefore does 
not have a value that is precisely ascertainable through objective 
outside measures.57  In contrast, cases involving the repossession and 
 
bondholder context); MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., SPECIAL COMMENT: CORPORATE 
DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES, 1920–2006, at 4 (Feb. 2007), available at 
http://www.moodys.com/cust/content/Content.ashx?source=StaticContent/Free%20Pages 
/Regulatory%20Affairs/Documents/default_and_recovery_rates_02_07.pdf (predicting 
potential tenfold increase in cumulative default rates should recession continue to worsen). 
53 See Benjamin N. Henszey, A Secured Creditor’s Right to Collect a Deficiency 
Judgment Under UCC Section 9-504: A Need to Remedy the Impasse, 31 BUS. LAW. 2025, 
2026–31 (1976) (outlining four approaches courts have taken toward creditors attempting 
to recoup deficiencies, including (1) entirely barring the deficiency; (2) allowing the 
deficiency but requiring the debtor to prove its loss; (3) presuming that, at a minimum, the 
collateral is worth the amount owed; and (4) making the deficiency subject to set-off under 
section 9-507(1)); see also discussion infra Part II (examining the evolving notions of 
commercial reasonableness amidst economic decline). 
54 See infra note 55 (identifying cases illustrative of the fact-dependent nature of Article 
9 cases). 
55 See Segovia v. Equities First Holdings, LLC, No. 06C-09-149-JRS, 2008 WL 
2251218, at *2–3 (Del. Super. Ct. May 30, 2008) (detailing a complex pledged stock 
agreement as collateral and discussing the sale process); Christie’s Inc. v. Davis, 247 F. 
Supp. 2d 414, 417–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining a secured financing arrangement where 
debtors pledged over $10.3 million in fine European artwork); Poti Holding Co., v. 
Piggott, 444 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (summarizing the defendant 
debtor’s argument that there was no readily ascertainable fair market value for the 
insulating machinery serving as collateral).  In Piggott, the court ultimately concluded that 
even though the collateral sale was not commercially reasonable, the secured party creditor 
sold the collateral at fair market value.  Piggott, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. 
56 See Davis, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 420–21 (discussing the defendant debtors’ allegations 
that the creditor undervalued fine decorative art prior to sale); Piggott, 444 N.E.2d at 1312 
(identifying sources for determining fair market value, such as admissions of fact and 
party testimony). 
57 See Davis, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (relying on deficiency owed on note rather than 
value of artwork collateral to establish outstanding debtor liability); Chem. Bank v. 
Haseotes, No. 93 Civ. 2846, 1994 WL 30476, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1994) 
(summarizing the facts surrounding the foreclosure sale of ocean tankers pledged as 
collateral); Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Air Ambulance, 516 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809–10 (S.D. 
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sale of motor vehicles rarely involve disputes as to whether the 
collateral sale price was reasonable because of the availability of 
reliable sale benchmarks.58  However, the bulk of case law defining 
secured party duties under section 9-610 involves motor vehicles as 
collateral.59 
Although a prudent secured party should ensure full compliance 
with section 9-610 to bolster a claim that he or she met the section’s 
requirements, often a secured party located far from the location of 
the collateral appoints a third party to carry out the sale.60  This 
approach, though commercially efficient, can lead to increased 
liability for the secured party, particularly in cases where the creditor 
relies on local officials in foreign jurisdictions to seize the assets and 
conduct the auction.61  One case involving the sale of four ocean 
tankers, Chemical Bank v. Haseotes,62 exemplifies this problem.63  In 
 
Tex. 2007) (explaining the defendant debtor’s affirmative defense that sale of aircraft 
pledged as collateral was not commercially reasonable). 
58 See, e.g., Herman Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 494–95 (Iowa 1977) 
(noting that the sale price of vehicles pledged as collateral was not in dispute on appeal); 
Consumer Fin. Corp. v. Reams, 158 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that 
the only issue on appeal was the reasonableness of notice of sale of the automobile rather 
than the sale price); Tex Star Motors, Inc. v. Regal Fin. Co., 246 S.W.3d 745, 751–52 
(Tex. App. 2008) (expounding on the basis for a creditor’s commercial reasonableness in 
foreclosing on automobile inventory based on industry sales practices).  In Betts, the court 
relied on an Iowa statute adopting section 9-610 (formerly section 9-504) in making its 
determination as to the commercial reasonableness of the creditor’s foreclosure of the 
debtor’s right of redemption through sale.  Betts, 251 N.W.2d at 496 (citing IOWA CODE § 
554.9504(3)). 
59 See, e.g., First State Bank v. Hallett, 722 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1987); Hicklin v. Onyx 
Acceptance Corp., 970 A.2d 244 (Del. 2009); Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492; Camden Nat’l Bank 
v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973); Wilkerson Motor Co. v. Johnson, 580 P.2d 505 
(Okla. 1978). 
60 See Whitney Nat’l Bank, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 809–10 (describing the process wherein a 
creditor advertised the sale of aircraft collateral in trade publications and responded to 
inquiries with bid packages); see also Piggott, 444 N.E.2d at 1312–13 (laying out factors 
relevant to the commercial reasonableness determination regarding an auctioneer’s sale of 
equipment collateral).  The creditor in Piggott, like the creditor in Whitney National Bank, 
relied on the process of advertising in trade journals and responding to bids via 
correspondence where a live public auction of large unwieldy collateral was not possible.  
Piggott, 444 N.E.2d at 1312–13. 
61 Haseotes, 1994 WL 30476, at *2 (outlining a process requiring a creditor to rely on 
the South African Court Registrar to conduct a foreclosure sale on ocean tankers). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at *4 (holding that the plaintiff creditor met its burden in showing commercial 
reasonableness despite the debtor’s contentions that the notice of and venue for the sale 
were insufficient). 
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Haseotes, the sale of vessels pledged as collateral was alleged to be a 
per se violation of local mortgage laws, section 9-610, and the 
security agreement between the parties.64  Given the mobility of the 
ocean vessels that were pledged as collateral, this provision of the 
security agreement exposed the creditor bank to increased legal and 
business risk.65  However, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York focused on the market value of the collateral 
and the creditor bank’s thorough process in advertising and 
conducting the sale in a foreign jurisdiction in finding that the creditor 
met its burden to demonstrate commercial reasonableness under 
section 9-610.66  Thus, despite the variable market conditions and the 
remote location of the collateral, the creditor bank was able to prevail 
on its motion to dismiss.67 
Similarly, in Whitney National Bank v. Air Ambulance,68 the 
secured party found itself in a complex situation where, after the 
debtor had defaulted on its loan agreement, the debtor committed 
additional violations of the security agreement by failing to maintain 
Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness certificates on the 
aircraft pledged as collateral.69  The debtor thus impaired the value of 
the collateral by its own conduct; the creditor, Whitney, responded in 
kind by notifying the debtor of its intention to conduct a private sale 
of the collateral under the security agreement.70  The creditor bank 
subsequently exercised its self-help right of foreclosure and hired an 
auctioneer to conduct the sale of the aircraft.71  The auctioneer 
advertised the sale in four aviation trade journals and sent out over 
500 e-mails and 100 bid packages to potential buyers.72  The auction 
yielded twenty-two bids for the various aircraft, yet the debtor’s 
deficiency remained at over $4.8 million after the sales had taken 
place.73  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
 
64 See id. at *3–4. 
65 Id. at *2 (describing the Greek and South African courts’ involvement in execution of 
a foreclosure sale). 
66 Id. at *4 (concluding that the plaintiff bank met its burden to establish commercial 
reasonableness in the disposal and sale of the collateral upon default). 
67 Id. at *5 (finding for the plaintiff bank on all counts). 
68 Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Air Ambulance, 516 F. Supp. 2d 802 (S.D. Tex. 2007). 
69 Id. at 806–08. 
70 Id. at 809. 
71 Id. at 809–10. 
72 Id. at 809. 
73 Id. at 809–10. 
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relied on the robustness of the auction process to grant Whitney’s 
motion for partial summary judgment on the remaining deficiency.74  
Haseotes and Whitney National Bank therefore illustrate the 
importance of engaging in a robust auction process for unique 
collateral under section 9-610 to minimize risk in light of extenuating 
circumstances and the potential for market instability.75 
II 
ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW 
Given that Article 9 was intended to provide self-help remedies for 
secured parties upon the debtor’s breach of the security agreement, 
the absence of a voluminous body of case law is not surprising.76  
Moreover, cases interpreting sections 9-207 and 9-610 are heavily 
dependent on the facts of each transaction.77  Most holdings are 
driven by the nature of the collateral and the secured party’s behavior 
in comparison to industry standard practices.78  In the case of unique 
collateral such as ocean tankers, airplanes, and oil rigs, industry 
practices remain difficult to define because of the limited size of the 
market for such items.79  Yet, courts must explore these areas of the 
relevant industry in assessing whether the secured parties properly 
preserved collateral and behaved with commercial reasonableness in 
 
74 Id. at 817. 
75 See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text (analyzing the implications of a 
secured party’s conduct on section 9-610 liability). 
76 See Clark, supra note 2, at 170–71 (exploring the self-help remedies available to 
secured parties under Article 9); Livingston, supra note 5, at 61 (observing that “courts 
have decided just a few cases under Revised Article 9 that deal directly with attachment 
and perfection issues”). 
77 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (detailing cases where the possession 
and sale of unique collateral posed challenges for assessing the secured party’s duty of 
commercial reasonableness). 
78 See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Haseotes, No. 93 Civ. 2846, 1994 WL 30476, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1994) (concluding that the secured party conformed with acceptable 
industry practice in carrying out the auction and sale process); Tex Star Motors, Inc. v. 
Regal Fin. Co., 246 S.W.3d 745, 751–52 (Tex. App. 2008) (relying on automobile sales 
industry practices to assess the commercial reasonableness of the secured party’s conduct); 
Whitney Nat’l Bank, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 817 (comparing the secured party’s conduct to 
industry practices in selling the aircraft collateral). 
79 See Haseotes, 1994 WL 30476, at *2 (summarizing the facts leading up to the default 
on a loan secured by ocean tankers); Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 634 
(S.D. Ohio 1973) (describing the oil-drilling machinery attached as collateral); Whitney 
Nat’l Bank, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 806–08 (explaining that the security agreement involved 
aircraft pledged as collateral). 
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selling collateral.80  The economic downturn adds another dimension 
to identifying patterns and trends in the case law through its effect on 
the valuation of collateral.81  However, courts are generally averse to 
making explicit references to economic factors in their reasoning 
beyond well-established legal rules and guidelines for establishing 
damages.82  The sections that follow support this trend and illustrate 
that the characteristics of the collateral, rather than external economic 
forces, drive determinations of commercial reasonableness under 
sections 9-207 and 9-610.83 
A.  Analyzing Section 9-207 Cases in Light of Economic Factors and 
Industry Practice 
For the purposes of this analysis, we have separated the section 9-
207 case law into two groups based on the date of decision: cases 
decided prior to 2001 and cases decided after 2001.84  This grouping 
 
80 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (identifying cases where courts delved into 
industry practice to assess commercial reasonableness). 
81 See supra notes 8–10, 14 and accompanying text (examining the effect of economic 
recession in valuing collateral). 
82 See United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1125 (1st Cir. 1987) (describing the 
creditor’s failure to safeguard collateral in its possession); Whitney Nat’l Bank, 516 F. 
Supp. 2d at 817 (comparing the creditor’s sale of aircraft to industry practices). 
83 See infra Part II.A–B (observing patterns in case law and noting courts’ emphasis on 
industry practices and the nature of collateral). 
84 The section 9-207(a) cases decided prior to 2001 in Group One include Lamp Fair, 
Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F.2d 173, 174–75 (1st Cir. 1989) (summarizing a secured 
financing agreement where the light fixture store served as collateral), Baus, 834 F.2d at 
1116 (describing a security agreement involving the debtor’s factory in Puerto Rico), 
American Express International Banking Corp. v. Sabet, 512 F. Supp. 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (explaining the facts of a case in which the Iranian government expropriated a 
debtor’s corporate assets as collateral), Ray, 358 F. Supp. at 634 (detailing the attachment 
process for oil rig collateral), and Barclays Bank v. Heady Electric Co., 571 N.Y.S.2d 650 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (assessing a secured party’s liability arising out of the sale of 
electric company assets). 
 The section 9-207(a) Group Two cases, which were decided after 2001, include Stead v. 
United States, 419 F.3d 944, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining a secured transaction 
involving an IRS tax lien), Harris v. Key Bank National Association, 193 F. Supp. 2d 707, 
716–17 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (exploring the secured party’s duty to preserve the value of the 
promissory note collateral), Chain Technology, Inc. v. Fleet National Bank (In re Handy & 
Harman Refining Group, Inc.), 293 B.R. 299, 302–04 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003) 
(summarizing a consignment transaction where the debtor gold refiner’s inventory and 
assets served as collateral), Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc. v. Stephenson (In re MJK Clearing, 
Inc.), 286 B.R. 109, 115–16 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) (describing the collateral as loan 
securities and other liquid assets), and Segovia v. Equities First Holdings, LLC, No. 06C-
09-149-JRS, 2008 WL 2251218, at *5–8 (Del. Super. Ct. May 30, 2008) (identifying a 
pledged stock agreement as collateral). 
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is adequately supported by economic contextual facts based on the 
post-9/11 recession in 2001 and 2002 and the “Great Recession” of 
2008 and 2009.85  This case grouping is further supported by the 
adoption of Revised Article 9 in July 2001.86  Though cases decided 
prior to 2001 may have been decided during a period of economic 
decline, the global implications of recent recessions, coupled with the 
increasingly complex structure of secured financing, supports this 
categorization.87  This grouping method is applied to the section 9-
610 case law in Part II.B.88 
Another observable dimension of section 9-207(a) case law is the 
difference in the interpretation of commercial reasonableness for 
cases involving unique personal property, such as specialized 
manufacturing equipment, and cases where financial instruments 
served as collateral.89  Interestingly, all but two of the post-2001 cases 
involved financial instruments, whereas nearly all of the cases 
decided prior to 2001 involved more tangible, unique collateral.90  
The small number of relevant cases prevents any large-scale 
conclusions as to the significance of this observation, yet this may be 
indicative of a larger trend toward an increasing role of complex 
financial assets in secured transactions.91 
During times of economic downturn, such financial assets can 
experience wide variation in their value, which is exemplified in 
Segovia and Harris where mismanagement of financial assets pledged 
 
85 See Bussel & Klee, supra note 14 (defining the parameters of the “Great Recession” 
to be 2008 to 2009). 
86 See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 3 (observing that all fifty states adopted the Revised 
Article 9 in July 2001); Livingston, supra note 5, at 47–49 (touting the advantages of the 
2001 revisions to Article 9).  See generally Ahern, supra note 2 (exploring the impact of 
the 2001 Article 9 revisions). 
87 See supra notes 8–10, 14 and accompanying text (chronicling the effects of the 
recession on valuation and secured transactions). 
88 See infra Part II.B (applying identical methodology). 
89 Compare Baus, 834 F.2d at 1116 (explaining the scope of a security agreement 
pertaining to inventory, equipment, and a plant as collateral), and Ray, 358 F. Supp. at 634 
(parsing through facts involving attachment of oil rigs as collateral), with Segovia, 2008 
WL 2251218, at *5–8 (delving into complex details behind the financial assets serving as 
collateral for various loan agreements), and In re MJK Clearing, Inc., 286 B.R. at 115–16 
(detailing the terms of a multifaceted transaction where loan securities and other liquid 
assets served as collateral). 
90 See cases cited supra note 84 (identifying only two cases, Stead and Chain 
Technology, involving tangible personal assets in Group Two (post-2001 cases)). 
91 See generally Livingston, supra note 5, at 61, 94–95 (asserting that the 2001 
revisions to Article 9 had a minimal observable impact on case law). 
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as collateral in part gave rise to the lawsuits.92  In both cases, the 
timing of attachment and secured party takeover of the collateral was 
critical to the outcome of the case.93  Though both courts engaged in 
lengthy discussions of the methods for assessing economic damages 
and defining the secured party’s rights to transfer the collateral upon 
default, neither court referenced larger economic conditions in 
making its holding.94  The absence of such reasoning supports the 
inference that the collateral type is much more critical to predicting 
the outcome of an Article 9 case than the economic context in which 
the case arose.95  Yet, despite the importance of the individual 
characteristics of the collateral in determining whether the secured 
party in possession of the collateral met its duties under section 9-
207(a), on a more fundamental level, the state of the overall economy 
in which the transaction arose remains relevant.96 
B.  Evaluating the Importance of Industry Practices and Economic 
Factors in Section 9-610 Cases 
For purposes of consistency in comparison, we have grouped the 
section 9-610 cases into two subsets based on their dates of decision: 
 
92 See Harris v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 193 F. Supp. 2d 707, 710 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(explaining the basis of the plaintiff’s claim that the secured party impaired the value of 
promissory note collateral in violation of section 9-207(a)); Segovia, 2008 WL 2251218, at 
*9 (summarizing the basis of the plaintiff’s claims against a secured party in conjunction 
with alleged mismanagement of the financial assets pledged as collateral). 
93 See Harris, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 710 (recounting the debtor’s allegations that the timing 
and nature of a transfer of promissory note collateral constituted a violation of the secured 
party’s duties); Segovia, 2008 WL 2251218, at *18–19 (detailing the basis of a conversion 
claim based on improper control and preservation of collateral). 
94 See Harris, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 715–18 (applying relevant provisions of Article 9 to 
define the secured party’s rights in possession of collateral without discussing economic 
conditions); Segovia, 2008 WL 2251218, at *23–24 (engaging in a lengthy discussion of 
direct and punitive damages without consideration of the larger economic context). 
95 See Harris, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 717–18 (finding that the secured party bank did not 
violate its duties with respect to promissory note collateral as a result of assignment); 
Segovia, 2008 WL 2251218 (examining the value of various stock assets in calculating 
damages). 
96 See Chem. Bank v. Haseotes, No. 93 Civ. 2846, 1994 WL 30476, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 1, 1994) (discussing the absence of a secured party’s duty to hold collateral until 
economic conditions improved in exercising the right of possession and disposal and 
stating that “[the secured party] was under no duty to risk throwing good money after bad 
in the hope that a previously volatile market would rebound to the benefit of Defendants”); 
supra notes 8–10, 14 and accompanying text (identifying secondary sources emphasizing 
the importance of larger economic conditions on valuation in transactions involving 
secured financing). 
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pre-2001 and post-2001.97  In contrast to the section 9-207 cases, 
claims involving alleged section 9-610 breaches with respect to the 
possession and sale of automobiles constitute a significant number of 
relevant section 9-610 cases.98  Because automobiles have a well-
established market and easily ascertainable pricing, we will not 
explicitly consider this group of cases due to the inherent differences 
between automobile cases and those involving unique collateral.99  
Generally, section 9-610 automobile cases involve claims of 
inadequate notice, which, though relevant to a secured party’s duties 
under section 9-610, often has little to do with economic 
conditions.100 
Unlike the two groupings of section 9-207(a) cases, which 
exhibited an observable difference in the nature of the collateral in 
terms of uniqueness, both groups of section 9-610 cases involve 
personal property pledged as collateral that lacks a true public 
market.101  The collateral in both section 9-610 groups ranges from 
airplanes to rare artwork, specialized machinery, and ocean 
tankers.102  Moreover, the section 9-610 cases rely heavily on an 
analysis of industry practices in determining whether the secured 
 
97 The cases decided prior to 2001 in the section 9-610 Group One include Haseotes, 
1994 WL 30476, at *2 (identifying the collateral as oil tankers located in Greece and 
South Africa), and Poti Holding Co. v. Piggott, 444 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1983) (explaining that insulating machinery served as collateral). 
 The section 9-610 Group Two cases consist of Whitney National Bank v. Air 
Ambulance, 516 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809–10 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (exploring whether a post-
default sale of aircraft pledged as collateral was commercially reasonable), and Christie’s 
Inc. v. Davis, 247 F. Supp. 2d 414, 417–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that the collateral at 
issue consisted of $10.3 million in European artwork). 
98 See supra notes 58–59 (identifying section 9-610 cases where automobiles were 
pledged as collateral). 
99 See supra note 58 (summarizing cases where notice and sale methods, rather than the 
price of the automobile, were at issue). 
100 See, e.g., Herman Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 494–95 (Iowa 
1977) (explaining that the reasonableness of the sales price of the vehicle collateral was 
not at issue); Consumer Fin. Corp. v. Reams, 158 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) 
(narrowing the issue on appeal to the reasonableness of the notice given to the debtor prior 
to the sale); Tex Star Motors, Inc. v. Regal Fin. Co., 246 S.W.3d 745, 751–52 (Tex. App. 
2008) (discussing the statutory requirement of commercial reasonableness). 
101 Compare cases cited supra note 84 (categorizing section 9-207(a) cases based on 
date and observing differences in the types of collateral involved) with cases cited supra 
note 97 (grouping section 9-610 cases involving tangible personal property pledged as 
collateral). 
102 See cases cited supra note 97. 
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party’s sale was indeed commercially reasonable.103  Though 
applying industry practices for selling large items such as airplanes 
and ocean tankers leads to a well-reasoned holding grounded in 
commercial reality, this process can easily undermine the 
predictability benefits that the UCC was intended to create.104  In 
other words, if each court that evaluates the commercial 
reasonableness of the sale of unique collateral must delve into a set of 
convoluted, specialized industry practices, the fact-specific nature of 
this inquiry undermines predictability.105  Furthermore, when 
predictability is compromised in business transactions, risk and 
transactional costs tend to increase.106  Therefore, this secondary 
effect of courts’ attempts to craft well-reasoned decisions appropriate 
for each case in fact makes the duty of commercial reasonableness in 
the section 9-610 cases blurry and inconsistent.107 
 
103 See Christie’s Inc. v. Davis, 247 F. Supp. 2d 414, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing the 
customary sales procedures in auctioning artwork as relevant to assessing commercial 
reasonableness under section 9-610); Chem. Bank v. Haseotes, No. 93 Civ. 2846, 1994 
WL 30476, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1994) (relying on industry practice in auctioning 
tankers in finding that the secured party carried out a reasonable sale); Poti Holding Co. v. 
Piggott, 444 N.E.2d 1311, 1312–13 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (focusing on “the normal 
commercial practices in disposing of collateral of this type” in assessing commercial 
reasonableness of a sale under section 9-610); Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Air Ambulance, 516 
F. Supp. 2d 802, 817 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (considering the secured party’s conduct in a sale of 
aircraft collateral in comparison to industry practice). 
104 See Piggott, 444 N.E.2d at 1313 (observing “the lack of precision” in defining 
commercial reasonableness under section 9-610). 
105 Id. (asserting that commercial reasonableness depends largely on “the particular 
facts in each case”); see also Livingston, supra note 5, at 47–49 (arguing that the need for 
increased uniformity and predictability drove the 2001 revisions to Article 9).  Moreover, 
the Piggott court relied on “those authorities which provide for a balancing of equities 
between the parties and allow the ‘remedy and the recovery . . . [to] be adjusted to the 
particular situation.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Barbour v. United States, 562 
F.2d 19, 21 (10th Cir. 1977)). 
106 See supra notes 8, 18 and accompanying text (linking economic conditions to legal 
and business risk); see also Chertok & Agin, supra note 9 (observing the complexities in 
valuing intangible personal assets during an economic decline); Hosmann, supra note 10 
(chronicling the difficulties of small business owners securing financing using aircraft as 
collateral amidst a deep recession); Nakamura, supra note 8 (noting the effects of a 
volatile economic sector on valuing assets such as oil-drilling equipment). 
107 Compare Piggott, 444 N.E.2d at 1312 (affirming that the plaintiff secured party’s 
conduct in auctioning wiring machinery was not commercially reasonable despite the 
robust public auction process), with Haseotes, 1994 WL 30476, at *2, 4 (concluding that 
the sale of collateral was commercially reasonable despite auctions in disparate locations 
such as South Africa and Greece).  In Piggott, the auctioneer notified over 200 parties of 
the sale of the equipment collateral and placed advertisements in several newspapers, 
including The Wall Street Journal.  Piggott, 444 N.E.2d at 1312–13.  Similarly, in 
Haseotes the auctioneer complied with the generic advertising requirements of a public 
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Surprisingly, clarification in the availability of the right of set-off 
in the 2001 revisions to Article 9 have had little impact on section 9-
610 cases.108  In theory, the common law right of set-off, coupled 
with a focus on industry practices, yields case decisions that are well 
aligned with commercial realities.109  The right of set-off is yet 
another self-help tool available to parties who find themselves in 
disputes over collateral valuation or the effect of the secured party’s 
breach of the duty of commercial reasonableness.110  Few cases, 
however, have involved parties employing the right of set-off as a 
self-help remedy in light of a breach of the secured party’s duties 
under section 9-610.111  Yet, given the dramatic increase in 
bankruptcy filings in the wake of economic turbulence, self-help 
remedies will continue to take on increased importance as parties seek 
to minimize litigation and transactional costs.112  Finally, as the body 
of case law continues to grow amidst debtor defaults involving 
complex collateral assets, additional trends may emerge to create 
more consistency in the jurisprudence in this area of the law.113 
 
sale under section 9-610 but secured only twenty bidders for the ocean tankers, and this 
sale was deemed commercially reasonable.  Haseotes, 1994 WL 30476, at *2, *4. 
108 See Livingston, supra note 5, at 84–85 nn.305–06 (observing that the former Article 
9 left open issues of set-off as a self-help remedy, which were closed by the 2001 
revisions); supra text accompanying note 5. 
109 See cases cited supra note 103 (identifying cases where the assessment of 
commercial reasonableness by comparison to industry standards was central to the 
holding). 
110 See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(10) (2000) (clarifying that Article 9 does not apply to the 
common law right of set-off but creating two exceptions: (1) section 9-340 applies to 
recoupment against deposit accounts, and (2) section 9-404 applies to defenses or claims 
of the account debtor). 
111 See Am. Express Int’l Banking Corp. v. Sabet, 512 F. Supp. 463, 468, 471 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussing the application of the right of set-off in a lawsuit following an 
expropriation of collateral by the Iranian government); Marine Midland Bank v. CMR 
Indus., Inc., 559 N.Y.S.2d 892, 898 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (construing the right of set-off 
as applicable to damages from an improper disposal of collateral). 
112 See supra notes 14, 18 and accompanying text (analyzing valuation and business 
risk amidst periods of economic decline and increased bankruptcy filings); see also 
sources cited supra note 2 (examining the impact of the 2001 Article 9 revisions on 
bankruptcy proceedings). 
113 See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (demonstrating the recognition of 
inconsistencies in case law and the need for increased uniformity). 
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C.  Bankruptcy Implications of Section 9-207 and Section 9-610 Case 
Law 
Bankruptcy cases are a common context in which debtor claims 
against creditors in possession of collateral may arise.114  Bankruptcy 
often serves as the trigger for a default of a security agreement, which 
then enables the creditor to engage in the self-help remedy of section 
9-207, provided that such action is allowable under the Bankruptcy 
Code.115  Thus, any creditor intending to exercise its right of 
repossession of collateral must be ever mindful not only of the Article 
9 exceptions to section 9-207 but also of the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code that might bar such action.116  Furthermore, in 
bankruptcy proceedings, valuation is often at the heart of the battle 
between secured and unsecured parties.117  Thus, an interpretation of 
the reasonable duty of preservation under section 9-207 can take 
center stage.118  Indeed, a secured party’s conduct in preserving 
collateral can easily lead to the payment or nonpayment of parties 
with lower priority when the bankruptcy estate is liquidated.119 
Valuation is also a fundamental consideration in assessing 
commercial reasonableness under section 9-610 given the tendency of 
courts to compare the sale price to the fair market value as one of the 
 
114 See Chain Tech., Inc. v. Fleet Nat’l Bank, 293 B.R. 299, 306 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
2003) (denying the debtor’s allegation that the secured party failed to preserve the 
collateral post-petition under section 9-207); In re MJK Clearing, Inc., 286 B.R. 109, 121–
22 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) (finding that the commingling of fungible assets did not violate 
the secured party’s section 9-207(a) obligations in bankruptcy). 
115 See Clark, supra note 2, at 145–46 (explaining the self-help provisions of section 9-
207, including the secured party’s duty of reasonable care with respect to collateral); 
Ahern, supra note 2 (explaining the interconnectedness between Article 9 and the 
Bankruptcy Code in post-default remedies). 
116 See Ahern, supra note 2 (connecting Article 9 to the Bankruptcy Code). 
117 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the critical importance of 
valuation in bankruptcy). 
118 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (identifying cases where debtors claimed 
that secured parties breached the duty of reasonable care under section 9-207). 
119 Ahern, supra note 2, at 117. 
 Understandably, creditors of bankrupt debtors often feel like restaurant patrons 
who not only hate the food, but think the portions are too small.  To press the 
analogy, they also don’t like having to wait in line for a table, possibly being 
seated only to find out the kitchen has just closed.  The bankruptcy court is a 
little like a soup kitchen, ladling out whatever is available in ratable portions to 
those standing in line; nonetheless, scarcity begets innovation in the hungry 
creditor’s quest to get a little more than the next fellow. 
Id. (quoting In re Omegas Grp., Inc., 16 F.3d 1443, 1445 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
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Article 9 Amidst Recession and Revision 
section 9-610 factors.120  Thus, a difference in valuation techniques 
can easily lead to the near full payment of secured creditors to the 
detriment of unsecured creditors.121  Though a consideration of 
priority issues exceeds the scope of this analysis, a secured party’s 
duty under section 9-610 has far-reaching implications for the 
bankruptcy estate in the sense that the sale of collateral fixes its value 
and allows for potential disbursements to creditors.122  Disputes 
arising from Article 9 are commonly decided as part of bankruptcy 
proceedings, which demonstrates the interdependence of secured 
transactions and the Bankruptcy Code.123 
CONCLUSION 
Although the asset path of sections 9-207 and 9-610 appears 
straightforward and clearly delineated, the duties of reasonable care 
and commercial reasonableness in disposal remain amorphous.  In 
particular, these duties—with respect to default, seizure, storage, and 
sale or use—depend heavily on the nature of the collateral.  The 
diversity of asset classification requires a multitude of skills, 
knowledge, expertise, and facilities to prevent secured party liability.  
This concern becomes most pronounced with respect to debt 
resolution based on a breach of the secured party’s duty of reasonable 
care or commercial reasonableness. 
The complexity of considerations in exploring sections 9-207 and 
9-610 cases, with respect to the collateral type and the potential for 
economic conditions to impact the outcome of the case, make 
corporate attorneys’ risk assessments in such cases increasingly 
complex.  Though the case law on these UCC provisions is in its 
nascent stages, this analysis has shown that the nature of the collateral 
itself, coupled with industry practices, form the basis of the large 
majority of federal and state cases in this area.  Therefore, economic 
 
120 U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (2005) (requiring commercial reasonableness in “[e]very aspect 
of a disposition of collateral”).  Though sales price alone is insufficient to establish 
commercial reasonableness under section 9-610, “a low price suggests that a court should 
scrutinize carefully all aspects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was 
commercially reasonable.”  U.C.C. § 9-610 cmt. 10 (2002). 
121 See supra note 119 (painting an analogy illustrating the scarcity of resources in 
bankruptcy). 
122 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of valuation 
in bankruptcy proceedings). 
123 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (analyzing bankruptcy cases involving 
claims of a breach of a secured party’s duty under Article 9). 
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conditions take on a secondary significance.  The fact-specific nature 
of secured transactions involving creditor possession and the sale of 
collateral upon default will undoubtedly persist; yet as more cases 
emerge, the definition of commercial reasonableness that is implicit in 
both section 9-207 and section 9-610 will become more clear.  In the 
meantime, practitioners would be wise to remain mindful of these 
considerations in evaluating the business and legal risks of these 
transactions amidst a global economy that continues its slow march to 
recovery. 
 
 
